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On the morning of June 9, 2009, an explosion occurred at a manufacturing plant in Garner, North Carolina. By the end
of the day, 68 injured patients had been evaluated at the 3 Level I trauma centers and 3 community hospitals in the
Raleigh/Durham metro area (3 people who were buried in the structural collapse died at the scene). Approximately 300
employees were present at the time of the explosion, when natural gas being vented during the repair of a hot water heater
ignited. The concussion from the explosion led to structural failure in multiple locations and breached additional natural
gas, electrical, and ammonia lines that ran overhead in the 1-story concrete industrial plant. Intent is the major difference
between this type of accident and a terrorist using an incendiary device to terrorize a targeted population. But while this
disaster lacked intent, the response, rescue, and outcomes were improved as a result of bioterrorism preparedness. This
article discusses how bioterrorism hospital preparedness planning, with an all-hazards approach, became the basis for
coordinated burn surge disaster preparedness. This real-world disaster challenged a variety of systems, hospitals, and
healthcare providers to work efficiently and effectively to manage multiple survivors. Burn-injured patients served as a
focus for this work. We describe the response, rescue, and resuscitation provided by first responders and first receivers as
well as efforts made to develop burn care capabilities and surge capacity.
At 11:27 a.m. on June 9, 2009, the first of many 911calls began flooding the emergency communications
center. The calls for help described an explosion at an in-
dustrial plant in Garner, North Carolina, a town in Wake
County near Raleigh. Approximately 300 employees had
reported for work that morning. By the end of the day, 3
were dead and 68 injured (another patient would succumb
to his injuries months later).
An investigation concluded that the explosion resulted
from a gas leak. Once the gas leak found an ignition source,
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the ensuing conflagration and explosion sent a shock wave
through the concrete building, causing exterior walls to
collapse, crushing cars parked next to the building, and
blowing large holes in the ceiling. As these walls and ceiling
sections collapsed, they ripped open additional supply lines
of gas and ammonia and exposed electrical lines in multiple
sections of the building, culminating in a horrific and
deadly scene.
The subsequent investigation concluded there had been
no purposeful intent, and terrorism was ruled out. Never-
theless, one method of terrorizing a population is to pur-
posefully explode an incendiary device to injure, mutilate,
and kill people and to destroy buildings and infrastructure.1
While this disaster lacked purposeful intent, the response,
rescue, and outcomes reflected many of the efforts of the
past decade in which terrorism and bioterrorism pre-
paredness had been a priority for emergency responders and
the healthcare system.
This article discusses the events that occurred at the in-
dustrial plant (identified on Figure 1 as A1 and pictured in
Figure 2), the preparedness activities that drove many of the
decisions that day, and the outcomes. We will briefly review
the care and management of the patients with burn and
blast injuries, based on the regional planning and pre-
paredness activities and the potential impact of patient
outcomes following the explosion.
Background
Following the September 11 attacks, there was a great sense
of urgency to build a more resilient healthcare system ca-
pable of responding to and preparing for terrorism and
bioterrorism attacks.2,3 The Bioterrorism Hospital Pre-
paredness Program (HPP) was one of the programs aimed
at offering national guidance (and financial support) for
state and local solutions.4
Since 2002, multiple planning and preparedness efforts
have developed across the nation. These efforts included
surge planning and preparedness as a critical component of
the HPP in response to a terrorist attack.4 National funding
and guidance for the HPP is provided through the De-
partment of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office of
the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response
(ASPR). Each state administers HPP through either Public
Health or Emergency Medical Services (EMS).
Figure 1. The Raleigh Durham metro area is home to 3 large healthcare systems with multiple hospitals. The disaster occurred at
point A1. The closest burn center is located at the main campus of UNC Hospitals and Healthcare, identified as H2. The closest Level
1 Trauma Center is WakeMed Health and Hospitals (main campus) identified as H3. Rex Healthcare is identified as H4, Duke
Raleigh is identified as H5, WakeMed Cary is identified as H6, and Duke University Medical Center (main campus) is identified as
H7. The distance between A1 and H2 was approximately 36 miles and primarily involved interstate highways. (Color graphics
available online at www.liebertonline.com/bsp)
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The HPP includes burn surge as a component of surge
planning.5 In North Carolina, burn surge planning was
developed in conjunction with an array of components
developed to create a state medical response system
(SMRS). The burn surge program evolved out of this effort
to include clinician education, surge planning for EMS
agencies, and community and regional hospitals as well as
statewide EMS protocols.6 (Initially, the Bioterrorism HPP
began in the Health Resources Services Administration; it
was transitioned to ASPR when the latter organization was
created in 2006. The name was shortened to HPP.)
The Event
Tuesday, June 9, 2009
At approximately 11:00 a.m. EDT, a caller to the 911
emergency communications center reported that an Am-
trak passenger train had collided with a private vehicle in
Cary (a town in Wake County).7 Given the potential for a
mass casualty incident, the initial alarm included multiple
first-response agencies, ambulances from the EMS system,8
and senior EMS officials as well as an ambulance bus
(AmBus). Those who were first to arrive reported there
were no injuries identified on the train but that the driver of
the vehicle that had collided with the train was dead. Other
than the first arriving ambulance, all other responses were
canceled.
Concurrently, the NC USAR Task Force 89 was con-
ducting a quarterly training exercise in southern Wake
County. This 36-person team includes specially trained
regional fire and rescue personnel who are available to re-
spond to particularly difficult rescue situations, such as
those occurring with structural collapse. (Their equipment
is similar in quantity and quality to that of the Federal
Emergency Management Agency [FEMA] designated
USAR10 teams used for large-scale national disasters.11-13
The NC USAR teams were developed following the Sep-
tember 11 attacks, using a Department of Homeland Se-
curity [DHS] grant program.)
At 11:27 a.m., as responders were returning from the
Amtrak response, the 911 emergency communications
center received the first of many calls reporting a large ex-
plosion in the Garner ConAgra Industrial Plant (where
Slim Jim products were made). Callers described a horrific
scene following the blast that had led to the collapse of
multiple sections of a single-story concrete building.
Callers on the 911 audio recordings pleaded for help,
asking for ‘‘everything you can send’’ and specifically
Figure 2. The aerial image capture relied on Google Maps October 2009 of the ConAgra Plant in Garner, NC. The damage is not
seen in the image but the areas of interest regarding command, treatment, staging, accountability, and collapse areas are identified with
the text boxes. The street in front of the building is Jones Sausage Road, a two-lane connector between Interstate 40 and the town of
Garner. (Color graphics available online at www.liebertonline.com/bsp)
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describing survivors with burns and orthopedic injuries.14
The first arriving EMS crews were met by many of the
approximately 300 employees who were evacuating the
building, fearing additional explosions or that more sec-
tions of the large concrete building could collapse.
Cause of the Explosion
Investigators would later determine that the explosion re-
sulted from a natural gas purge that was performed while a
hot water heater was being replaced.15 The purging had
occurred intermittently for approximately 2 hours, with the
gas eventually finding ‘‘one of many ignition sources
around 11:25 EDT.’’15 While several safety steps were
taken, including cutting off the gas source that directly
supplied the water heater, the common practice of using the
‘‘sense of smell’’ to recognize when the gas concentrations
had reached unsafe levels did not alert the workers.15 Once
the gas source was shut off, it was believed the residual gas
in the line would dissipate into the building. Un-
fortunately, the concentration of vented gas remained
dangerously high until it reached an ignition source.
First Responders/Emergency Medical
Services
The first response was led by the Wake County EMS Sys-
tem.8 The EMS system includes 41 ambulances immediately
available for 911 response. In this county, there are an ad-
ditional 60 + licensed ambulances across all services, with
approximately 100 available at peak times and including a
medical helicopter and a county AmBus. This agency is also
the home for one of the NC Ambulance Strike Teams (in-
cluding the AmBus) and NC State Medical Assistance
Teams, both developed through the HPP program; both
were involved in response or manpower supply.
All of these resources fall under the county EMS um-
brella for continuity of care, standards of care, and conti-
nuity of practice (Table 1). These resources provide a
formidable response to a mass casualty incident.16
Because the train-related activities had occurred less than
an hour prior to the explosion, there were multiple agency
vehicles still on the road returning to their stations at the
time of the Garner explosion. In addition to the medical
responders, fire departments, rescue agencies, and various
law enforcement officers had responded earlier as well, re-
sulting in a large-scale force that was in the process of de-
mobilizing and on the road.
Given the nature of the explosion alarm and structural
collapse and the uncertainty surrounding the cause of the
blast (ie, purposeful or accidental), the NC USAR Task
Force 8 team left their training exercise and responded
to the incident. They arrived within minutes of the ex-




The first responders on the scene initially encountered
hundreds of distressed workers; they were guided to a
makeshift medical evaluation area adjacent to the industrial
site (identified in Figure 2). As the triage process began, those
who had no identifiable injuries were sorted from those with
more obvious medical needs. Several EMS officers assumed a
command role in unified command and organized the
medical branch of the incident. They coordinated the flow of
resources and response activities during the early stages of the
response. The physician medical director (for the local EMS
system) was one of the first to arrive, and he provided triage
oversight with subsequent support of clinical decision mak-
ing before the injured were transported to area hospitals.18
It has been our experience that there is considerable
downstream success when triage goes well.19,20 When triage
does not go well, it can set off a cascade of problems that are
difficult to resolve in the midst of a disaster.21,22 Each NC
EMS agency is required to have a ‘‘triage and destination
plan’’ that includes predetermined destinations, based on
HPP guidance, for trauma and burn patients.23 The county
EMS system’s mass casualty plan follows the HPP guidance
and also reflected the Israeli experience. This includes a
focus on minimal on-scene treatment and rapid, coordi-
nated transportation to appropriate hospitals with an em-
phasis on equal patient distribution when possible.24-27
Ambulance Triage
and Transport Decisions
The most critically injured patients were triaged for trans-
port to WakeMed, the closest Level I trauma center to the
Table 1. First Responders and Emergency Medical Services
Wake EMS System (EMS Responders)
Wake County EMS 44
Apex EMS 4
Cary Area EMS 8
Eastern Wake EMS 12
Total EMS Ambulances 68
Hospital/Healthcare System Based EMS
WakeMed Mobile Critical Care Services 24
Rex Hospital Transport 5
Total Hospital Based Ambulances 29
Private Ambulance Services
First Choice Medical Transport LLC 3
Johnston Ambulance Services (Wake) 4
North State Medical Transport (Wake) 6
Samaritan Ambulance Service 9
Tri-Star Medical Transport Inc. 7
Total Private Ambulances 29
Helicopters Based in Wake County
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site of the disaster (shown in Figure 1 as H3). One patient
with critical burn injuries, and potential concomitant inter-
nal hemorrhage, was triaged first to the closest trauma center
for an initial evaluation. The remaining 3 burn-injured pa-
tients were transported directly to the closest burn center (at
UNC Hospitals, shown in Figure 1 as H2, which is co-
located with another regional Level I trauma center).28
The first 12 patients triaged as either ‘‘red tag’’ or ‘‘yellow
tag’’ were transported within the first hour following the
explosion.29 Another 31 ‘‘worried well’’ patients were
transported within the next several hours to area hospitals,
including Rex Healthcare, a 433-bed hospital also located
in the area.30,31 In aggregate, the distribution of injured
patients by EMS included approximately 12 to WakeMed,
10 to Rex Hospital (shown in Figure 1 as H4), 11 to
WakeMed Cary (shown in Figure 1 as H6), 7 to Duke
Raleigh (shown in Figure 1 as H5), and 3 with critical burn
injuries to the Burn Center at UNC Hospitals. The EMS
phase of the operation ended at approximately 14:30, with
the remaining EMS resources converting to a supportive
role for ongoing rescue and recovery operations and inci-
dent assessment activities. (An additional 24 nonemergency
patients presented in the hours or days following the di-
saster to the various hospitals in the metro area outside of
the EMS system. The Chemical Safety Board identified and
reported 68 total patients, with 43 known to have been
transported by the county EMS system.15 See Table 2.)
First Receivers/Area Hospitals
The 3 Level I trauma centers located within 35 minutes of
the scene include WakeMed Health and Hospitals,32 in
Raleigh, Duke University Health System in Durham (shown
in Figure 1 as H7),33 and the University of North Carolina
(UNC) Hospitals and Healthcare System in Chapel Hill.28
UNC Hospitals includes the NC Jaycee Burn Center as well
as a Level 1 trauma center. Other community and regional
hospitals in the area include Rex Healthcare, Duke Hospital
Raleigh, Durham Regional Hospital, WakeMed Cary,
WakeMed Apex, WakeMed North (Apex and North are
freestanding emergency departments), and Holly Hill
Hospital, a Behavioral Health Hospital located adjacent to
the WakeMed Raleigh campus.
All of the area hospitals were alerted to the disaster by the
State Medical Asset Resource Tracking Tool (SMARTT).
SMARTT is a state-based electronic program for tracking
bed availability and other resources during a disaster. The
creation and ongoing operation of SMARTT is funded
through the HPP. The trauma centers and the Raleigh area
community hospitals all activated their emergency opera-
tions plans and opened their emergency operations centers.
Based on disaster planning and preparedness activities they
have developed based on the HPP, each was prepared for a
surge of patients.
Hospital Status at the Time
of Disaster
The morning of the explosion, the burn center had 39
inpatients. Given that there are 36 beds allocated for the
care of burn-injured patients, the service line was already
functioning in excess of its peak capacity prior to the in-
cident. Excess capacity is routinely managed by admitting
additional burn-injured patients to the burn service line but
placing them in overflow beds from other specialties that
are in physical proximity to the burn center. In this case, a
patient’s care is still managed by a burn surgeon, but the
training of the nursing staff is generally more aligned with
postsurgical care or other similar conditions.
This overflow system was already in use when the hos-
pital received alerts at 12:03, 12:05, and 12:10 p.m. that
critically injured burn patients were en route from the
Garner explosion. At that point, the total number of in-
bound patients was not known.
The morning of June 9 was an otherwise typical morning
at UNC Hospitals, with a full operating schedule well
under way, a busy emergency department, and an inpatient
census that was near capacity. In anticipation of the surge,
systems were rapidly operationalized to create additional
operating room, intensive care unit, and trauma/burn
specialty resources. The 3 ambulances associated with the
initial set of alerts arrived at the emergency department
between 12:25 and 12:32 p.m.
Operational tactics that are designed to optimize staffing
requirements and bed availability may show signs of failure
when a system is unexpectedly stressed by a sudden surge of
unanticipated patients.19,34-38 Regional disasters like the
Garner explosion can easily overload a healthcare system.
This surge can lead to system failure through immediate
introduction of multiple high-acuity patients. This threat










UNC Hospitals and Healthcare Main Campus 3 698 H2 Yes Yes
WakeMed Health and Hospitals Main Campus 12 575 H3 Yes
Rex Healthcare 10 433 H4
Duke Raleigh Hospital 7 186 H5
WakeMed Cary Hospital 11 156 H6
Duke University Medical Center Main Campus 0 924 H7 Yes
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underscores the need for proactive plans to distribute the
surge of patients and ease the associated burdens.39,40
Transport Decisions for the Patients
with Burn Injuries
The 3 patients with critical burn injuries were triaged from
the scene and sent directly to the burn center, with a fourth
going to the nearby trauma center with a potential internal
hemorrhage before being transferred later to the burn
center. Three additional patients with less severe burn in-
juries were initially evaluated and managed at an area
hospital before subsequently being transferred to the burn
center later that evening. A total of 7 patients with burn
injuries would eventually be transported or transferred to
the burn center in the first 8 hours after the explosion.
Data from the Burn-Injured Patients
Specific patient data for the 7 patients with burn injuries were
reviewed (based on UNC IRB 05-1545). This review and
analysis involved Burn and Trauma Registry data and relevant
EMS prehospital patient care reports. Patient demographic
data, initial care provided at the scene, transport destinations,
transport times, the total body surface area (TBSA) assessment
of the burn injuries, and patient days in the hospital were also
included. The review also covered key objectives discussed
during the burn surge education programs, compliance with
prehospital treatment protocols, adequacy of field TBSA re-
porting (rule of 9s) when compared to subsequent assessments,
initial airway management, oxygen therapy, and pain man-
agement prior to hospital arrival as well as patient outcomes.
Results
The disaster occurred in a metropolitan suburb, with 3 Level
I trauma centers and 1 burn center located in the immediate
area. There were more than 300 employees in the building at
the time of the explosion, and, of these, 68 sought medical
care. Seven patients suffered burn injuries. Of these 7 sur-
vivors with burn injuries, the 3 most critically injured were
triaged and taken directly to the region’s burn center. Their
injuries included TBSA burns ranging from 45% to 57%,
and all presented with concomitant inhalation exposure. The
2 intrastate burn centers were evaluating available capacity
within 30 minutes of the explosion. In addition, burn centers
in neighboring states were contacted regarding their poten-
tial capacity within 2 hours of the explosion.
Data
 Of the 71 people in the building at the time of the
explosion, 7 suffered some form of burn injury (9.9%).
 Four of those 7 patients also had inhalation injuries
(57.1%).
 The 3 patients with critical burn injuries were trans-
ported directly from the disaster scene to the burn
center, consistent with the triage and destination plan.
 Of the 7 patients, 4 were male and 3 female.
 Ages ranged from 30 to 65 years, X = 45.8
 Total Body Surface Area (TBSA) burn inju-
ry = (2% £ · £ 52%) and (X = 21.3%)
 Patient weight at admission in kilograms = (69kg £ ·
£ 110kg) and (X = 84.4kg)
 Length of stay/patient days = (6 £ · £ 159) and (X =
49.3)
Prehospital Interventions
The common approach for all thermal burn injuries in the
NC EMS protocols includes airway management/oxygen
support, TBSA assessment, fluid resuscitation based on
the TBSA assessment, wound management with clean
dry dressings, pain assessment/management, and transport
directly to the closest burn center where the distance is
predetermined to be reasonable by the system medical
director.41
For the 3 patients transferred directly from the scene to
the burn center by EMS:
 A TBSA assessment relying on rule of 9s was completed
and reported for each patient, 60% to70% TBSA.
 An intravenous line was established using 0.9% NaCl
solution on all 3 patients (it should be noted this EMS
system does not have lactated Ringer’s stocked on the
ambulances; 0.9% NaCl solution was the available fluid).
 Oxygen was administered to all 3 patients by non-
rebreather masks at a rate of 12-15 liters per minute
(lpm) during transport, and an airway assessment was
conducted to determine if an advanced airway should
be placed.
 Follow-up and ongoing assessments were conducted in
the ambulance to reevaluate traumatic injuries, and
none were noted.
 Pain management assessment was completed on all
patients, with all patients reporting pain of 10 on a
scale of 1 to 10.
 Morphine sulfate (MS) was administered intrave-
nously to 2 patients, who each received a total of
15 mg during transport. The third patient had IV
access complications, and the MS was delayed until
arrival at the hospital.
Burn Center Arrival Times
The 3 most critical patients arrived at the burn center be-
tween 12:25 and 12:32 p.m. A fourth patient was trans-
ferred from the trauma center and arrived at 2:42 p.m.
Three more patients were transferred from a community
hospital and arrived between 7:45 and 8:21 p.m.
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Activity in the Emergency
Department
The 3 critically injured patients who were transported di-
rectly from the scene to UNC Hospitals were seen in the
emergency department and transferred to the burn center
within 45 minutes of arrival. Their continued care included
reassessing for traumatic injuries, airway assessment,
changing fluids to lactated Ringer’s solution, inserting a
Foley catheter for all patients, obtaining a tetanus history,
and wound management including monitoring core body
temperatures.
Activity at the Burn Center
All surgeons who cover for the burn center service line,
including the 4 physician assistants and 2 residents, were
notified. Trauma surgeons were also notified of the incident
and incoming alerts. An operating room was made available
and held, and available trauma ICU, flex, and step-down
beds were identified.
All 3 of the critical patients were in the burn center and
undergoing lifesaving care within 45 minutes of arrival.
This care included airway management, resuscitation ef-
forts, and surgical debridement including escharotomies
and fasciotomies. The fourth patient with burn injuries,
who had initially been seen at the nearby trauma center,
arrived within 3 hours of the blast.
The burn center includes a 21-bed dedicated intensive
care unit and an additional 15-bed acute burn and wound
care unit. This is a busy burn center, and the staff are
accustomed to an ever-changing census. This includes
triaging burn admissions and caring for patients and
sometimes relying on beds and resources in areas of care
adjacent to the burn center. All burn patients requiring
resuscitation or with special burn care needs are admitted to
the burn ICU. The morning of the explosion, every burn
ICU bed was occupied. Upon notification of incoming
patients and a potential burn mass casualty incident,
nursing administration and bed coordination worked to
determine bed availability. Three burn ICU beds were
cleared, with multiple crews from housekeeping, central
supply, and equipment playing key roles in cleaning and
preparing the rooms for new patients.19,42
A distinct challenge with critically injured burn patients
is the length of stay and long-term care requirements. The 3
most critically injured had average initial inpatient stays of
121 days each, totaling 362 patient days, before discharge
(1 patient expired). The long-term impact on staff fol-
lowing large disasters has been discussed before and remains
an important consideration when weighing the need to
keep or transfer patients in the hours and days following a
burn disaster.34,43
Nursing, respiratory, and other support staff were asked
to discuss splitting shifts and surging to assure coverage
during the days and weeks that would follow the surge of
patients. Historically burn disasters have created staffing
instability, and it was essential to keep the staffing hours
reasonably distributed to avoid this problem experienced by
others.43
Discussion
The bioterrorism HPP originally focused on surge capacity
and building capacity for scarce resources, including pedi-
atric, trauma, and burn care, in response to a terrorist at-
tack.44,45 Managing burn injuries in the context of a greater
disaster was envisioned as a significant threat. While this
disaster lacked intent, the balance of the concerns played
out in this scenario.
When the state burn surge disaster plan was created,
organizers recognized that there was a greater issue than
capacity that would undermine any programmatic success if
left unaddressed.34 Unlike the case for blunt and pene-
trating trauma, a distinct undertone of discomfort existed
for non–burn facilities to manage even a single burn-
injured patient for any extended period of time.5 During
initial meetings conducted around the state to invite
stakeholder input on the details of a potential plan, it was
determined that any successful effort would have to include
a component of burn care education.46
Conclusions
The statewide bioterrorism planning efforts included plan
development, extensive statewide education, revision of
statewide EMS protocols and destination guidelines, and
regional hospital coordination. All of these efforts con-
tributed to an effective response and positive patient out-
comes. Time on scene and in transit, care in transit, time in
the ER, and entry into the burn center were optimized and
better than those reported with previous disasters.
The county EMS system is operationally and clinically
an outstanding organization. For this disaster, components
of local and state planning and preparedness efforts played
out effectively. The successes reflect the local, state, and
national efforts to create a more resilient and prepared
healthcare system.
Given the total resources in the region, and the size and
scope of this disaster, this was a small event. Nevertheless,
there were valuable lessons that have broad application for
future disasters, including managing the flow of vehicles on
a 2-lane road, such as the one in front of the industrial
plant, to reflect the need for ambulances to leave with pa-
tients and while more fire, rescue, and emergency resources
were arriving.
While this explosion was not an act of terrorism, the
same elements, other than intent, were present. It should be
noted that this disaster occurred in a jurisdiction in which
the stakeholders in medical disaster response (EMS,
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community hospitals, trauma and burn centers) are accus-
tomed to working closely with one another and have been
actively involved in the medical disaster planning process.
Nevertheless, early in the disaster it was clear it would
challenge everyone involved. Early notification of adjacent
burn centers to determine capacity aided decision making
at the burn center where casualties were initially received.
The high survival rate was a product of excellent initial
EMS care and triage decisions and outstanding medical care
provided at all of the area hospitals.
While this was not a large disaster in terms of total
patient numbers, the elements involved were significant.
From an explosion involving 300 people and a concrete
building to a wide array of injury patterns, this was cata-
strophic for those injured and their families. The out-
comes also affirm that preparedness and planning make a
difference.
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